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The paper discusses the conception, execution, and outcomes of the first Soviet-Somali histor-
ical expedition, in 1971. In due course, the Soviet-Somali Expedition set out to create a “usable 
past” for Somali nationalism, rooted in the history of Mohammad Abdullah Hassan, a religious 
and military leader who had fought against the British in Somaliland between 1900 and 1920. 
The paper investigates how Soviet ideas about the preservation of historical heritage were 
grounded in Central Asian modes of practice and how these became internalised by Soviet 
Africanists in their attempts to help reinforce foundational myths in newly independent African 
states. The paper argues that the Soviet model for the preservation of cultural heritage, as 
envisioned by Soviet Africanists, aimed to reinforce Siad’s national project for Somalia. Their 
efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, however, because of Cold War constraints and misunder-
standings of local realities. 
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Introduction 
On 10 September 1971, Siad Barre, the head of the Somali Revolutionary Council (SRC), 
spoke to a group of Soviet scholars who had arrived to participate in the first joint Soviet-Somali 
historico-archeological expedition. “Imperialists always wrote lies about us. They collected such ma-
terials that had no value; made photographs of those objects which showed us in the wrong light. 
Your expedition and research should be cardinally different from what has been written by bourgeois 
authors. You have to be seekers of truth,” Barre admonished the Soviet members of the team (Go-
rodnov 1974, 77). The Soviet team had arrived in Somalia in July of 1971. The expedition was to be 
“complex” in its approach in that it comprised a multidisciplinary team, which aimed to study Soma-
lia’s history, economy, and sociology to assist the Somali government with its modernising goals. 
The Soviet-Somali expedition, then, sought to use Somali cultural heritage to help Barre’s regime 
construct a national-revolutionary meta-narrative of history—a “usable past” for a new, modern, and 
unified Somalia (Ranger 1976). 
The Soviet concept of heritage and its application in the USSR and the peripheries has 
been extensively studied. After taking power in 1917, the Bolsheviks sought to create their own her-
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itage. Thus, they undertook massive projects in re-shaping urban spaces, destroying and creating rev-
olutionary monuments, buildings, and museums (Gonzalez 2016). The relationship of the Soviet re-
gime with its pre-revolutionary cultural heritage was more complex. Certain monuments were de-
stroyed, but others were “purified” of their capitalist or Orthodox components and appropriated to 
serve the revolution (Kelly 2012). In Soviet Central Asia, the recovery of the Timurid heritage served 
a particularly important purpose of constructing Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Tajiks into nations and na-
tionalities (Gorshenina and Tolz 2016). From the 1960s onwards, the Soviets started using spaces 
like Tashkent as models for revolutionary transformation, which could be applicable to Muslim coun-
tries in the Middle East and elsewhere (Strongski 2010). Historians have recently started to explore 
the ways that Soviet ideas and practices were picked up, emulated, and adapted outside of the USSR. 
In the socialist countries, museums played a huge role in framing the nation’s narrative in Marxist-
Leninist terms. In Cuba, museums were designed according to a specific template, designed to repli-
cate a scientific meta-narrative of national history consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideology to re-
mould citizens into New Men (Gonzalez 2016). However, we know little about the uses of these ideas 
and practices outside of the socialist bloc.  
This paper looks at the planning, execution, and outcomes of the Soviet-Somali expedi-
tion of 1971. First, the paper traces the origins of the so-called “complex approach” of the Soviet-
Somali expedition, looking at the ways that large excavation and preservation projects were designed 
in Central Asia. Second, the paper investigates how and why the expedition was envisioned by Sergey 
Smirnov, Ivan Izosemovich Potekhin’s deputy at the Institute of African Studies (IAS)—in competi-
tion with Western dominance over the production of knowledge on Africa. The expedition was de-
layed until 1971, as an intensification of Soviet-Somali exchange followed Barre’s proclamation of 
his adherence to socialism in 1969. Third, the paper traces the goals of the expedition, specifically 
focusing on the way that Soviet historians employed Somalia’s cultural heritage to construct a narra-
tive of a strong, anti-colonialist, and centralised state.  
Since the 1990s, Somalia’s monuments have fallen into disrepute, its tangible heritage 
neglected by a succession of governments. While continuous civil war remains a crucial factor, ar-
cheologist Sada Mire says the seeming neglect is due to an incorrect focus on physical objects with 
no value in a nomadic society (Mire 2011). By looking at the Soviet-Somali expedition, this paper 
draws attention to the link between the disregard for cultural heritage and the failure of the post-war 
Somali nationalism. The paper is based on the archival records of the expedition at the IAS as well 
as diaries and field notes from the participants.  
 
1. Origins of the “Complex Approach”: Central Asian Expeditions, the Institute of African 
Studies, and Decolonisation of Africa’s Cultural Heritage 
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Central Asia has played a central role for Russian preservationists and heritage experts 
since the nineteenth century. Andreas Schoenle argues that Russian intellectuals of the nineteenth 
century believed that “European Russia” lacked historical monuments comparable to those of West-
ern Europe. In the Russian Empire, efforts at preservation thus focused on the spectacular Timurid 
monuments of Turkestan as part of a “civilising mission” in the East. These buttressed the status of 
the Russian Empire as one of the leading European powers. While many monuments were damaged 
or put to other uses during the years of the Russian Revolution and the subsequent civil war, the 
Bolsheviks considered preservation to be of utmost importance in soliciting indigenous support for 
revolution in Central Asia. In 1924, Soviet Central Asia was divided into national republics and cor-
responding titular nationalities: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.  
The national delimitation of Central Asia, argue Svetlana Gorshenina and Vera Tolz, was 
a key moment, when an imperial project of preservation became an ethnocentric one, with local elites 
increasingly engaged in the process of using heritage to build formulations of “national culture” for 
the titular nationalities (Gorshenina and Tolz 2016). To aid in the process, major Soviet expeditions 
were dispatched to Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in the 1930s to excavate and study the 
ruins of ancient civilizations. The expeditions reflected the rise of the autochthonist concept, which 
interpreted the heritage of all previous epochs as the possession of a particular nationality, thus 
providing basis for the 1924 delimitation. For these reasons, these were the so-called “complex ex-
peditions,” which involved historians, philologists, and anthropologists working together—a multi-
disciplinary approach that aimed to bridge the study of the ancient, medieval, and modern periods 
(Bustanov 2015). 
The biggest and longest-standing of these was the Khorezmian Expedition, directed by 
Soviet ethnographer Sergey Pavlovich Tolstov. “Khorezm” was an ancient Iranian civilisation that 
occupied a large oasis in the Amu Darya River in western Central Asia, located in present-day Uz-
bekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The development of Central Asia had started in the 1930s 
and gained momentum in the late 1950s and 1960s, not least because the region was to serve as an 
example of successful socialist development, an actionable model for the Third World (Kalinovsky 
2018). Tolstov’s recipe for success was to marry scientific research, heritage preservation, and Soviet 
developmental goals. He became passionate about the idea of restoring water supply to a section of 
the Amu Darya River, which had fuelled the Khorezmian civilization in ancient times. Thus, he be-
came involved in the grandiose (and ultimately, unfulfilled) project of supplying water to Central 
Asia by reversing the flow of the Siberian Rivers (Arzhantseva 2013). In practical terms, Tolstov’s 
“complex approach” included many teams of experts—archeologists, ethnographers, and technical 
developmental experts—working in Khorezm on their separate tasks.  
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The success of the Khorezmian expedition made Tolstov a powerful figure within Soviet 
academe. In 1942, he became the Director of the Institute of Ethnography at the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences. In the 1950s, Tolstov worked to reappraise the research activities of the institute, since 
interest in ancient culture had to give way to mandated explorations of contemporary life on collective 
farms and among urban workers (Klejn 2012). Through the success of the Khorezmian expedition, 
however, Tolstov’s “complex approach” gained currency in the Soviet academy. One of the Soviet 
academics who worked closely with Tolstov in the 1950s was Ivan Izosemovich Potekhin, the first 
director of the IAS, established in 1959 in Moscow. 
Potekhin believed that the “complex approach” should be one of the organising principles 
for the IAS. This meant that the institute should be multi-disciplinary, that it should encompass the 
study of contemporary African economics and society, but also languages and history (Davidson 
2003). Potekhin was adamant that the IAS should engage in the study of African history as an anti-
imperial and anti-colonial exercise. In his 1961 article for the magazine Kommunist, Potekhin argued 
that the study of history, including pre-colonial history, was not only a scientific but a political task. 
Soviet historians of Africa were to uncover the “truth about the historical past” of the African people 
and it was to become a powerful tool to undermine the ideological cover for the “new forms of colo-
nialism” (Potekhin 1961). The lack of primary resources for the new Marxist history of Africa re-
mained a continuous concern for men like Potekhin, who attributed great importance to the study of 
history at the IAS. Speaking at the meeting of the IAS in 1962, Potekhin admitted that knowledge of 
Africa was still quite shallow because Soviet researchers almost never did field work in Africa and 
thus did not possess primary materials of their own; their work was almost exclusively based on 
materials collected by “bourgeoisie Africanists from imperialist countries” (Transcript of Third IAS 
Coordination Meeting, 23–24 April 1962).  
One of Potekhin’s allies at the IAS and a defender of the “complex approach” was Sergey 
Rufovich Smirnov. A student of the famous linguist Dmitriy Olderroge,  Smirnov in 1946 defended 
his PhD on the Mahdist Uprising. He became the first Soviet Africanist to analyse the history of the 
region from a Marxist perspective. He worked with Tolstov and Potekhin at the Ethnography Institute 
and became the first head of the History Section at the IAS in 1960 (Davidson 2003b, 152-69). Like 
Potekhin, Smirnov believed that the IAS should adopt a multi-disciplinary approach and that the study 
of history should include experts in various sub-fields, including archaeology. He believed that the 
Soviet Union should organise archeological expeditions to Africa to explore the continent’s pre-co-
lonial history. These Soviet Academy of Sciences were sceptical of these proposals because there 
were only a few Soviet Africanists and no Soviet archeologists who specialised in Africa (Transcript 
of Presidium Meeting, 12 December 1960). In addition, the Soviet leadership wanted the IAS to focus 
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on “contemporary” social and economic problems, providing research notes and briefings for devel-
opmental projects. After Potekhin’s death in 1964, the focus of the institute shifted to the study of 
contemporary problems, especially Africa’s economic development. Smirnov remained the head of 
the History Section, however, and continued to defend the importance of historic research in Africa 
(Davidson 2003b). One country that became particularly interesting to him in this regard was Soma-
lia. 
2. The Inception of the Soviet-Somali Expedition and the Cold War in the Horn of Africa 
Somalia became an independent country in 1960 as a result of the merger of British So-
maliland and the Trust Territory of Somaliland under the premiership of Abdirashid Ali Shermarke 
of the Somali Youth League (SYL). One of the key objectives of the SYL was unification of what 
they regarded to be Somali territories—in northern Kenya, French Djibouti, and the Ogaden (eastern 
Ethiopia)—into “Greater Somalia.. The idea had originated with the British in 1946, as a way to 
consolidate their interests in East Africa, with Somalia (and the Ogaden) at that point under the British 
Military Administration. The “Greater Somalia” idea quickly acquired enormous popularity with the 
SYL, originally a self-help organisation of government clerks and gendarmes that now promoted 
educational and social improvement programs and tried to move beyond the divisive clan system. 
The idea also spread among the Somali Ogaden clans. However, the USA, USSR, and France opposed 
the proposal. In 1954, Britain returned the Ogaden to Ethiopia. Once in power, the SYL continued to 
campaign for the unification of all Somali territories—in northern Kenya, French Djibouti, and the 
Ogaden (Barnes 2007, 277-91). As Kenya was about to achieve independence, in 1963 the British 
decided to incorporate the Northern Frontier District, inhabited by ethnic Somalis, into Kenya, 
prompting President Shermarke’s urgent request for military assistance to defend the country against 
“imperialist aggression.” The SYL leadership first turned to the US for military assistance to build 
up its army, but, unhappy with the quantity of aid, promptly turned to the USSR in 1961 for assistance. 
In 1963, Soviet military assistance to Somalia expanded to include arms transfers and scholarships 
for Somali officers. This was the moment when Sergey Smirnov arrived in Mogadishu as part of the 
Soviet-Somali agreement on cultural cooperation. His main aim was to collect documents about the 
history of Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan and his campaign against the British in northern So-
malia (1900–1920).  
By the 1960s, Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan (1856-1920) had become the key 
figurehead for SYL’s nationalist aspirations. Born in the interior of British Somaliland, he first left 
for Aden in the 1870s, where he worked as a fireman for one of the steamships.  He then travelled to 
Egypt, where he apparently heard stories about the leader of the Mahdist Uprising in the Sudan—
Muhammad Ahmad ibn el-Sayed. After performing a hajj to Mecca and joining the Salihiyya Sufi 
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order, he returned to Somalia, where he started to preach and established a dervish (Sufi-based) move-
ment. In 1899, he declared jihad against the British, operating from a capital in Taleh, and managed 
to dispel a number of British raids against him. His rule in Somaliland only ended in 1920 after the 
British bombing of Taleh; he retreated and died of illness in the same year. By the 1960s, many 
Somalis and in particular the SYL nationalists had come to consider Sayyid Mohammed an independ-
ent and proud leader, unwavering in his stance against the British. Hassan’s patrimonial Ogaden lin-
eages and his links to the region also brought legitimacy to nationalist claims to “Greater Somalia.” 
He also became venerated as a man of “great words,” lambasting his enemies in succulent classical 
verse, crucial to the Somali oral tradition, which would form the basis of the Somali anti-imperialist 
cultural heritage. He became a symbol of national unity, transcending “tribal divisions” yet remaining 
true to Islam. President Shermarke spoke of Sayyid as “a visionary, the father of the modern Somali 
nation” (Laitin 1979, 95-115).  
Smirnov’s objectives during the 1963 trip to Somalia dovetailed with those of the Somali 
nationalists. The British were wrong to call Sayyid Hassan a “Mad Mullah,” argued Smirnov, who 
arrived in Mogadishu to collect primary sources on the uprising to “fill in the gaps” in the Soviet 
literature on the subject and revise the narrative of the campaign, which had been written by Western 
scholars from an “imperialist point of view.”  He also wanted to make a trip to Taleh—the centre of 
Sayyid Mohammed’s uprising in Somaliland—where he expected to look at and record the ruins of 
the military structures erected, before they “fell into ruin.” While Smirnov could not make the trip, 
his visit quickly bore fruit. In particular, with the support of an official in Somalia’s Ministry of 
Education, Moussa Galal, he managed to organise a meeting with Sheikh Abdurahman, the son of 
Sayyid Mohammed. According to Smirnov’s account, the sheikh was “strongly opposed to coopera-
tion with any English or Italian scientists” but was sympathetic to the USSR. He thus agreed to meet 
Smirnov and tell the story of his father’s struggles. Smirnov and Sheikh Abdurahman met regularly 
in 1963, with the letter telling Smirnov the latter’s version of the war in “great detail.” Apparently, 
he also promised to share his father’s archive, which contained a number of highly valuable docu-
ments, including Sayyid Abdurahman’s correspondence with British generals, the Ethiopian Emperor 
Menelik, the German consul in Harar, and the Turkish generals. Smirnov thus recommended that the 
IAS should organise a joint Soviet-Somali archeological expedition to trace the history of Sayyid 
Mohammed’s campaign. According to Smirnov, Somali authorities were open to such a plan, and 
were willing to provide transportation and interpreters (Davidson 2003b, 158-61). 
Rivalry with British scholars played a part in Smirnov’s justification for the expedition. 
Smirnov stated that the Soviet acquisition of Somali primary sources would raise the prestige of So-
viet African Studies, especially since access to archival documents in Sudan, Ethiopia, and the United 
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Arab Republic was closed off to Soviet researchers. To Smirnov, who had spent most of his profes-
sional life analysing the Mahdist Rebellion without access to primary sources, the “find” of primary 
sources in Somalia must have been exciting, especially given that access to Mahdist files in the Sudan 
in the mid-1950s, he complained, had been dominated by Peter Holt, a British historian and Head 
Archivist at that time. The deterioration of Somalia’s relations with Britain (in 1963, the Somali gov-
ernment broke relations with the UK and Kenya over the Northern Frontier District) thus offered 
opportunities for Soviet Africanists to shape the meta-narrative of history for the young republic (Da-
vidson 2003b, 158-61). 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) also 
played a role in Smirnov’s calculations. The British-backed UNESCO plan for Somalia, reported 
Smirnov, included the provision of £220,000 for the construction of a new museum, national library, 
a building for the archive, and so on. Smirnov worried that UNESCO had apparently already agreed 
to collaborate with Mogadishu on joint study of historical monuments, ethnography, and the oral 
tradition, with Somali students slated to attend courses in London for scientific research. All of these 
measures, reported Smirnov, were backed by the “widely famous” School of African and Oriental 
Studies (SOAS), which had close links to the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To Smirnov, there 
was no doubt that the SOAS- and UNESCO-backed plan for the preservation of Somali heritage was 
a Trojan Horse for British influence in the region: “In this case we can witness an active British 
attempt to use scientific contacts for the ideological expansion in a county of its political influence. 
England, France, Belgium, and Italy, all former colonial powers, are actively pursuing such a course 
of action. The USA are not too far behind” (Davidson 2003b, 161). 
Smirnov’s justification for the joint Soviet-Somali expedition was motivated by a desire 
to increase the academic prestige of IAS. To Smirnov, Somalia’s past and its cultural heritage was to 
be mined to help establish a counter-narrative to the colonialist and imperialist one. Similarly, unlike 
Western historians of the early post-independence period, like Basil Davidson, Soviet Africanists 
were motivated by the search of an “authentic” African past worthy of a new nation (Cooper 1994). 
As a Marxist-Leninist historian, however, Smirnov wanted sources to establish a credible narrative 
of anti-colonialist struggle for the new nation. UNESCO had been central to post-war contestations 
around world history, exemplified by its “History of Mankind” book series, to which the Soviets 
objected early on. Soviet objections to US hegemony in UNESCO meant they only joined in 1954. 
In the following years, the Soviets would come to collaborate with the organisation, trying to interject 
the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of world history into projects such as “History of Mankind” (Betts 
2015). In his concern over the role of UNESCO in Somalia, Smirnov clearly expressed continuous 
Soviet reservations about continuous Western cultural dominance. To Smirnov, Somali cultural her-
itage was to serve as a building block for a new, “scientific” and Marxist-Leninist history of Africa 
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to break the colonial narratives and forms of domination, now disguised as apolitical UNESCO pro-
jects. Soviet-Somali relations cooled down in the following years and the decision on the expedition 
was delayed for many years. The ideas of the expedition would be revived after a 1969 coup d’etat 
in Somalia brought to power a new military regime, headed by Siad Barre.  
 
3. The 1969 Revolution and the Soviet-Somali Expedition  
Upon coming to power in 1969, Siad Barre and the SRC announced a program of far-
reaching social and economic reforms under the banner of “scientific socialism.” Barre’s economic 
program included state involvement in the economy and was partly a pragmatic move to raise pro-
duction in order to raise living standards under centralised management and increase agricultural 
production to alleviate the consequences of the 1968 drought. In 1970, the government nationalised 
all foreign banks, petroleum distributors, and the Italian-Somali electric power company. Nonethe-
less, the ownership of livestock and bananas, Somalia’s main export commodities, remained in pri-
vate hands, and Barre assured businessmen that wholesale nationalisation was not on the govern-
ment’s agenda. Italy remained Somalia’s largest trading partner and provided significant support and 
investment, such as in the establishment of the Somali National Bank and high-value building pro-
jects. Other key investors included Iraq, the European Economic Community, and the World Bank. 
The early period of economic reforms was also known for the highly publicised “self-
help projects,” which were crash schemes to mobilise the urban population up to seven hours a week 
to help construct government-designed schools, classrooms, clinics, hospitals, and libraries (Patman 
1990). “Scientific socialism” in Somalia represented a variety of radical African nationalism that 
attempted to combine ways of state interventionism with an onslaught against the clan-based system 
and “tribalism” that furthered the dream of “Greater Somalia.” The Soviets quickly hailed Siad 
Barre’s coup as “progressive” and were quick to extend assistance to his regime, especially following 
setbacks in Egypt and Sudan. In addition to $100,000 in famine relief, Moscow wrote off $2 million 
in past debt and offered a $5.5 million grant to construct oil depots (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 
1971). Barre himself was expected to visit Moscow in November 1971. It was at this critical juncture 
that the IAS received final approval for the expedition from the Somali authorities. 
The preceding years were a turbulent period for the IAS. After the death of Ivan Potekhin, 
debates continued about the purpose of the institute and the role of its History Section. Speaking to 
the Presidium at a meeting on 4 September 1964, the new director, Vasiliy Solodovnikov, argued that 
the time had come for the IAS to become more engaged in investigations of contemporary African 
problems, in line with recommendations from the government. As for the History Section, Solod-
ovnikov believed that Soviet Africanists should use original archival materials to appeal to African 
elites (Transcript of IAS Scientific Council Meeting, 4 September 1964). As the IAS proceeded with 
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the new practical agenda, criticism of this practical approach was fairly common (Transcript of the 
IAS Scientific Council Meeting, 28 April 1967, 21). Nonetheless, Solodovnikov insisted the History 
Section should provide solutions to practical problems: “I believe that historical research have mean-
ing if they give us an answer to contemporary problems and allow [us] to look into the future” (Tran-
script of the IAS Scientific Council Meeting, 3 July 1970, 93). The 1969 Revolution in Somalia of-
fered opportunities not only to fulfil Smirnov’s original plan for conducting research into the history 
of Sayyid Hassan’s movement, but also to show it could make practical recommendations on current 
issues pertaining to Somali-Soviet relations. 
The 1971 programme of the Soviet-Somali “complex historico-archeological expedition” 
was updated in line with such logic. One part was retained from Smirnov’s recommendations: Soviet 
and Somali historians were to travel to the north of the country to collect documents, oral history 
data, and other evidence pertaining to the history of Sayyid Mohammed’s war. The historians were 
particularly to focus on the ruined forts constructed by the Dervishes in Taleh and Medeshi in northern 
Somalia. However, the new objective of the expedition was to analyse the “social structure” of Somali 
society, alongside a survey of state involvement in the economy. This was to be done by way of a 
massive survey among various groups, such as university and high school students and factory work-
ers. In terms of outcomes, the expedition was to produce concrete results and advice about the devel-
opment of Soviet-Somali economic and political cooperation; problems in the work of enterprises 
built with Soviet assistance; and the conditions for the distribution of publications in the country. The 
revision of the programme, argued Solodovnikov, was justified because of the “progressive coup in 
Somali” and new practical tasks in the work of the IAS (Solodovnikov 1971, 13-15). These aims were 
reflected in the mixed nature of the group, which included several historians (Vlalentin Gorodnov, 
Alexander Nikiforov, Petr Kupriyanov), a political scientist (Nikolay Kosukhin), and an economist 
(Evgenii Sherr). On the Somali side, the expedition included Sheikh Jamaa Umar Issa, a collector of 
Sayyid Hassan’s poems, and Said Warsame, a Somali archeologist, an alumnus of the Leningrad State 












Figure 1. The routes and sites covered by the 1971 Soviet-Somali expedition. The 
northern sites covered included Taleh, Zeila, Borama, Hargeisa, Erigavo, Bokhotlekh, and Eyl. (Ni-
kiforov, Gorodnov 1976). 
 
The Soviets arrived in Mogadishu in 1971—the height of Siad Barre’s campaign against 
“tribalism,” Somalia’s divisive clan system. That year, tribalism was outlawed, with Siad Barre in-
structing all Somalis to “wage war against tribalism.” The slogan “Tribalism divides – Socialism 
unites” was continuously repeated in speeches and aired on national radio. The former local lineage 
village headmen were replaced by elders with the titles of “peace-makers” and the payment of blood 
money was abolished, with swift fines and prison sentences assigned to those who were deemed to 
engage in ‘tribalist behaviour’. The word ex (clan) was outlawed for its tribalist connotations and 
replaced with jalle (friend, comrade), which was launched into common parlance. The anti-tribalism 
campaign of 1971 culminated in a mass demonstration and the burning of effigies associated with 
“tribalism, corruption, nepotism and misrule” (Bakonyi 2015). Under Siad Barre, the lionisation of 
Sayyid Hassan’s struggle against the British reached new levels, largely due to his clan affiliation, 
which linked him and Barre to the Darood clans and thus to the Ogaden. According to the literary 
scholar Ali Jimale Ahmed, there was a complete “Dervishisation” of Somali historiography under 
Siad Barre’s regime, with the Sayyid hailed as the hero of the national resistance struggle (Barnes 
2006). In the course of their five-month stay, the Soviets attempted to use the heritage of Sayyid 
Hassan’s struggle against the British as the foundation for Barre’s new Somalia, free of “tribalism.” 
The Somali authorities were clear that the goals of the Soviet-Somali expedition had to 
chime with their modernising agenda, where Sayyid Hassan was to play the role of a unifying figure 
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in a nationalist-revolutionary narrative that connected the Dervishes’ struggle to Siad Barre’s gov-
ernment. That much was clear from a conversation between General Mohamed Ali Samatar, a Gen-
eral in the Somali National Army and a member of Siad Barre’s Supreme Revolutionary Council, and 
the members of the expedition on 23 August 1971. Like Siad Barre before him, Samatar argued the 
goals of the expedition should be practical; they should involve decolonisation of Somali history, 
which had been “falsified by the colonisers” (Kosukhin 1973). To Samatar, this meant not only writ-
ing the history of Sayyid Hassan as a national hero, but also linking him to the revolution of 1969 and 
to Siad Barre himself. Speaking to the delegation on 25 September, Samatar recommended that the 
expedition should make a trip to Luuq Ganaane, an old town close to the Somali-Ethiopian border. 
There, he claimed, the Somalis had fought against the colonisers and the Ethiopians. Sayyid Hassan 
had also visited Luuq Ganaane, where he wrote a poem about wanting to reach Kismayo, in the south 
of the country. To Samatar, this was proof that Sayyid Hassan wanted to build a unified state. Most 
importantly, he continued, it was in Luuq Ganaane that Siad Barre had spent his childhood (Kosukhin 
1973). 
The explorations of Sayyid Hassan’s history started in Mogadishu. Although Sayyid Has-
san’s son Abdurrahman Mohammed Abdullah had died in 1966, thereby depriving the expedition 
access to his father’s archive, the expedition interviewed the rest of his family resident in the capital—
his brother, young son, and grandson. These conversations apparently filled in certain gaps in Sayyid 
Mohammed’s biography. For example, the expedition found out that, Hassan’s uprising had only a 
tentative one to the Mahdist Uprising in the Sudan (1881-1899). Unlike the leader of the Mahdists, 
Muhammad Ahmad, Sayyid Hassan had never proclaimed himself a “mahdi” (a religious messiah). 
He was only a “sayyid”, which the Soviets defined as “chief, religious leader” (Solodovnikov 1971, 
47). This confirmed to the Soviet delegation that he did not want to put himself above his followers. 
While this was not entirely true since the honorific title ‘sayyid’ denoted someone who claimed de-
scent from Prophet Mohammed. However, it was important for the Soviet delegation who wanted to 
establish Sayyid Hassan as the fundamental figure in Somalia’s  national-revolutionary narrative, 
where Sayyid Hassan was not primarily a religious leader, but a nationalist, anti-colonial fighter. The 
Soviet-Somali expedition sought to strengthen the link between Sayyid Hassan and Siad Barre’s rev-
olution, to establish a new, “usable” version of the past for a new, revolutionary Somalia. In his 
introduction to the volume on the expedition, the Soviet historian Nikolay Kosukhin articulates just 
such a nationalist-revolutionary meta-narrative: 
The information allows to shed the light on the organic connection between the heroic 
past of the Somali people and the current stage of revolutionary development in the country…The 
liberation movement under the leadership of Sayyid Mohamed Hassan was one element in a chain of 
events, connected with the struggle of the Somali people against colonizers and oppressors, which 
found its clearest expression in the revolution of 21st October 1969. It served as the beginning of 
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liberation from socio-economic backwardness, putting it on per with other countries of socialist ori-
entation. (Kosukhin 1974, 13) 
 
Since the history of Sayyid Hassan’s struggle was crucial to the foundational narrative of 
the Somali state, the expedition focused its investigation in the north, where the Dervishes built a 
series of forts in their struggle against the British in 1900–1920. Somalia’s cultural heritage was to 
serve as the main symbol for the nationalist-revolutionary narrative. 
The focal point for reconnaissance was Taleh, an important location for Sayyid Hasan 
and his army of Dervishes between 1910 and 1915. Bombed by the British in 1920, Taleh was home 
to a number of buildings, which the Soviets described in some detail: a fortress, built as a series of 
forts in a circle (Silsilat), surrounding a collection of tombs; a watch-tower built on a hill (dar-ilalo); 
a house for Sayyid and his family (Falat); a hotel tower for guests (Tale). Besides, the Taleh ruins 
contained a large storage space for provisions and armaments and a weapons repair workshop. The 
Soviets also discovered that the Dervishes had tried to grow grains for the army in the lands surround-
ing the forts. In contrast to the perception of “stateless” Somali nomads, the Soviets believed that 
these farming practices of the Dervishes were evidence that Sayyid Hassan was in the process of 
establishing a unified state. The Soviet expedition also argued that evidence of state formation was 
clear from the development of the Dervishes’ army, which had a clear four-tiered hierarchical struc-
ture. The formation of the army and the development of agriculture, trade, foreign relations, and the 
legal system at Taleh—all this showed that Taleh was fundamentally a centre of political life, the 
“political centre for a young state.” The reconnaissance of ruins at Mereshi and Eyl also led to the 
same conclusion. Sayyid Hassan’s fortress in Eyl, a grandiose structure, was never used for military 
purposes. It was built for prestige, as a military headquarters for Sayyid Hassan (Gorodnov 1974, 32). 
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 Figure 2. A photograph, depicting panoramic view of the Taleh ruins, taken by the So-










Figure 3. A photograph of the Dervishes’ fortress in Eyl. Photograph taken by the Soviet 
members of the expedition.  
 
The main recommendation of the Soviet expedition was to entrench the nationalist-revo-
lutionary narrative of Sayyid Hassan and Somalia’s struggle in a museum. According to Nikiforov 
and Gorodnov’s popular account of their expedition, “A Trip to Taleh”, the expedition made a number 
of recommendations to codify the memory of Sayyid Mohammed. One of them was the construction 
of a museum dedicated to Sayyid Mohammed and the national-liberation struggle. While we don’t 
know to what extent the Soviet recommendations indeed lay behind the decision, a statue was erected 
in Mogadishu (Nikiforov 1976, 143), constructed in socialist realist style, of Sayyid Hassan sitting 
on his horse atop the Silsilat fortress. The monument itself was decorated with murals, representing 
Somailis’ struggle against colonialism. By visually reconstructing the Taleh ruins, Siad Barre aimed 












Figure 4: A statue of Sayyid Hassan atop “Taleh fortress” in Mogadishu. 
 
Somalia’s medieval cultural heritage was also to serve the new nation. In November, Ni-
kiforov and the Soviet-trained archeologist Said Warsame visited several sites related to the history 
of the Adal Sultonte (Kingdom of Adal), which had reached its peak between 1415 and 1577.  On 17 
November, having arrived at Zeila, one of the important towns for the Adal Kingdom, Nikiforov and 
Warsame found the city in ruins since the majority of citizens had crossed over to the French Djibouti. 
They found that the city could not be restored, with the exception of the two mosques. “One of the 
most unique historical architectural heritage sites of Somalia is almost completely lost for the next 
generation and represents a point of interest only from an archeological point of view”, wrote Niki-
forov in his diary (Kosukhin 1973, 195). On the same trip, Nikiforov and Warsame also visited the 
island of Saadin. Located opposite Zeila, Saadin was an important ancient site for trade, where East-
ern African slaves, ivory, and glassware were exchanged for goods coming from all over the world, 
including Chinese porcelain. The Soviets recommended that both Zeila and Saadin should be subject 
to a detailed archeological survey as a rich source of materials for the study of the Somalian coast 
(Kosukhin 1973, 196). Such archeological study had important political meaning. As Nikiforov and 
Warsame argued, the study of the Adal Period could be used by the young Somali Democratic Re-
public in building national consciousness and eradicating the “worst aftermath of colonialism—trib-

















Figure 5. A medieval mosque in Zeila. Photograph taken by the Soviet-Somali expedi-
tion. 
 
While Sayyid’s struggle represented a good foundation for modern statehood, research 
into various aspects of society showed that there were still many obstacles to socialist transformation 
in Somalia. Nikolay Kosukhin, who conducted the sociological surveys together with economist 
Evgeniy Sherr, complained that they had placed the surveys in the local newspaper twice, but only 
received five answers. Using Marxist analysis, Kupriyanov recorded a process of “class differentia-
tion” among sedentary peasants, but many of them had not yet felt any positive outcomes from the 
1969 revolution. Capitalist exploitation still dominated village life, with harsh working conditions 
and low wages. In his study of the Somali nomads, Alexander Nikiforov reported that many nomads 
would be willing to settle down as agriculturalists. However, climatic conditions and lack of arable 
land require high levels of state-funded investment. While the movement towards sedentary life was 
central to any modernisation project in Somalia, any “hasty measures” in this regard would lead to 
“dangerous tensions” in the country (Individual Reports 1971, 57). While the Soviets were extremely 
cautious about the sedentisation of the Somali nomads, they believed without a doubt that agriculture 
was superior to a nomadic lifestyle on the scale of human civilisation and associated the former with 
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statehood. A very similar set of beliefs with regard to Central Asia had not only led to crash seden-
tisation of nomads, but also to the archeological search to prove an ancient urban and agricultural 
heritage for peoples of the region (Bustanov 2015, 61). 
Many of the Soviet recommendations remained on paper. Initially, the prospects for long-
term Soviet-Somali cooperation in cultural heritage preservation seemed bright, as Moscow approved 
plans to make the expedition a permanent joint venture. Writing up the summary of their research 
project, Kosukhin stated that the expedition involved the Somalis in the process of “reconstructing 
the heroic past” and contributed to the “development of its national consciousness” (Kosukhin 1974, 
10). Two members of the Soviet team went back to Somalia for a follow-up trip in 1973. However, 
plans for a permanent expedition in Somalia never materialised. Soviet-Somali relations cooled down 
again after the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia. Emboldened by Ethiopia’s weakness, Siad Barre estab-
lished the Western Somali Liberation Front to take control of the Ogaden. The Soviets first tried to 
negotiate with both sides, but finally switched their support to Ethiopia in 1977, and Soviet relations 
with Mogadishu broke down.  
However, UNESCO work in Somalia continued to follow at least some of the goals of 
the Soviet-Somali expedition. The emphasis of UNESCO activities in the realm of cultural heritage 
had always been on museums. The focus was the famous Garesa museum in Mogadishu. Opened in 
1933 during Italian rule, Garesa had been one of the oldest museums in Tropical Africa, boasting a 
collection of 3,000 artefacts from all over Somali territory. A string of UNESCO officials in 1966, 
1976, and 1978 had written up detailed reports and recommendations for the improvement of facilities 
at the Garesa museum. In 1976, Dr. Nazimuddin Ahmed from Pakistan advised the establishment of 
an Antiquities Service and the building of a new museum to host Garesa’s artefacts. Siad Barre’s 
regime was not particularly interested in Garesa, which, to them, was a relic of the country’s colonial 
past. They were interested in establishing a new cultural heritage for their revolution. The Somali 
government was not interested in following UNESCO’s advice for the preservation of cultural mon-
uments and did not ratify the 1972 World Heritage Convention. UNESCO officials recognised these 
limitations and tried to adapt them to the needs of Somali nation-building. In a report for UNESCO 
from 1979, Merrick Posnansky lamented the fact the public paid little attention to the work of the 
museum and that there was little effort to use the museum as an instrument of nation building. Well 
aware that the government was engaged in constructing a “museum of revolution,” Posnansky tried 
to pitch his view that the restoration of the Garesa Museum and preservation of its artefacts could 
contribute to the goal of nation-building: 
The potential of a museum is grasped in the Museum of the Revolution currently being ar-
ranged in Mogadiscio, but a dynamic approach to museum still has to be realised. Museums 
should preserve all the important objects of today—the broadsheets of Revolution, photo-
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graphs of wall slogans, tools used to initiate projects, breakthroughs in intermediate technol-
ogy such as the looms or agriculture implements. All will be treasured by tomorrow’s gener-
ation. (Merrick Posnansky 1979, 6) 
 
The Somali government indeed built a “National Museum” as part of the Mogadishu cul-
tural centre in 1987. It was a four-storied building with four exhibition floors, adjoining a four-storied 
building for technical and administrative offices. The exhibition rooms formed the shape of an oval 
ring, with a concentric corridor outside. According to a 1988 UNESCO report, the building of the 
National Museum was a substantial achievement, through which one could “sponsor national identity 
and knowledge of the past threatened with disappearance due to the growing acculturation process” 
(Crespo-Toral 1988, 3). Here again, UNESCO believed the construction of the museum was crucial 
to the identity of the Somali nation—an objective with similar underlying goals to the Soviet-Somali 
expedition, albeit deprived form its specific ideological content.  
Since the late 1980s, Somalia’s cultural heritage has fallen into oblivion. One important 
reason was the ongoing civil war. In an influential piece, Sada Mire has also argued that the reason 
why the Somalis, including on an official level, neglected cultural heritage lies in the values of Somali 
society. What Western experts failed to realise, argued Mire, was that the Somalis’ understanding of 
culture and cultural heritage focused not on preserving objects, useless in nomadic life, but of 
knowledge and skills, transmitted orally from one generation to the next. Therefore, any efforts at 
heritage protection in Somalia should be focused on the preservation of oral heritage rather than 
physical objects (Mire 2011). The story of the Soviet-Somali expedition and cultural mission of 
UNESCO in Somalia shows that these efforts were shaped by similar modernising assumptions, as-
sumptions that prioritised the writing down and museumification of Somali history. The politics of 
cultural heritage in Somalia was closely connected to Somalia’s nationalism. While the Somali gov-
ernment did neglect objects that were connected to the colonial past, they tried to use selective cultural 
heritage to construct a new foundational myth for the Somali state. The failure of that narrowly de-
fined nationalist project does much to explain the failure to establish a new framework for Somalia’s 
cultural heritage. Mire’s concept of a “knowlege-based” cultural heritage is now entrenched in 
UNESCO’s recommendations for Somalia. In Somalia, UNESCO is now concerned no longer with 
museums, but with preserving and promoting an intangible heritage and community-based initiatives 
to promote peace building (Padilla and Trigo-Arana 2013).  
 
Conclusions 
The story of the joint expedition gives us an insight into the ways that the Soviets tried to 
apply their ideas and practices of cultural heritage in the context of post-independent Somalia. As 
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Marxists-Leninists, the Soviets saw the world in terms of stages of development, with history evolv-
ing in stages, hurried along by a revolutionary vanguard. From this perspective, national develop-
ment, with all of its gimmicks—national culture, heroes, myths, and heritage—was central to devel-
opment of a nation. In Central Asia, the Soviets had engaged in active nation-building projects, with 
Timurid heritage acting as one of the crucial building blocks for the new Muslim Republics. In So-
malia, Soviet Africanists acted to recreate the required template, as they sought to reinvent Somali 
cultural heritage in a Marxist-Leninist vein. This included the narrative of a Somali nation as a series 
of struggles against foreign invaders, culminating in the victory of Siad Barre’s revolutionary regime. 
Sayyid Hassan was a central figure in that narrative, as he played a crucial role in the nationalist-
revolutionary meta-narrative for the new nation. That is why the Soviets encouraged the codification 
and museumification of a narrative of “national-liberation struggle” not unlike what was done in Cuba 
and other socialist countries. These aims coincided with those of Siad Barre’s regime, which was in 
the process of constructing a new state built on a selective reading of Somalia’s history.  
Many of the ideas and practices of the Soviet Africanist had practical antecedents in 
“complex” multi-disciplinary expeditions in Central Asia. These included the prioritisation of towns 
over the countryside, of agriculture over nomadism. To the Soviets, the cultural heritage of Dervishes 
in Taleh became a particularly important site of nation-building because it contained evidence that 
Sayyid Hassan was a national and an anti-colonial leader. As in Central Asia, Somalia’s medieval 
cultural heritage, centred around the mythology of the Adal Kingdom, also had to be connected to 
the contemporary history of Somalia. To aid economic development and modernisation of Somalia 
was the ultimate goal of the Soviet-Somali expedition. Hence, no wonder it was a multi-disciplinary 
expedition, engaged in a multitude of practical developmental tasks. With the transformation of the 
IAS into an institute for the solution of practical problems, its staff used some of the methods adopted 
by Tolstov in Khorezm to marry Soviet goals in Somalia with their desire to raise the prestige of the 
Soviet African Studies. 
Barre’s revisionist reading of what constituted a Somali nation ultimately led to a bloody 
and costly war with Ethiopia and a break with the Soviets. However, the fundamental nation-building 
ethos of the Soviet-Somali cultural expedition remained the central focus of Western experts, includ-
ing those from UNESCO. Much more research needs to be done into the design, objectives, and 
outcomes of Somalia’s national museum, established in the 1980s. It could provide useful insights 
into the evolution of Siad Barre’s regime and Somalia’s official nationalism. The oblivion and de-
struction of “revolutionary” heritage associated with Siad Barre such as the national museum and the 
monument to Sayyid Hassan are at least partial testament to the failure of Barre’s nationalist project. 
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Sada Mire’s “knowledge-based” approach provides the best prospect of community-based reconcili-
ation in the region. The reconstruction and preservation of Somalia’s “tangible” cultural heritage may 
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